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The Great Cauldron: A History of Southeastern Europe, by Marie-Janine Calic, trans
Elizabeth Janik. Harvard University Press, 724 pp, €39.95, ISBN 978-0674983922
Marie-Janine Calic’s The Great Cauldron is a huge, erudite and panoramic history
of southeastern Europe from late antiquity to the present day. Her use of the phrase,
southeastern Europe in the title, rather than the Balkans, is an interesting and not
merely a semantic point, as it highlights a central plank of the book. That phrase
encapsulates an argument that says southeastern Europe is Europe – an integral part
of Europe – that has shaped and been shaped by its history, and not some other
place, a borderland that is only partially European.
The Balkans only became the Balkans from the late nineteenth century, a
designation that brought with it connotations of otherness, non-Europe, or only sort
of Europe. Before that much of southeastern Europe was simply “Turkey in Europe”
or the Near East as newspapers tended to call the region. Those parts of the Balkans
which were not part of Turkey in Europe were, of course, also ruled by imperial
powers, either Austrian or Venetian.
While the people of the region acknowledge that it is often known as the Balkans,
there is a slight distaste for the label. Balkanisation is associated with political
fragmentation and irrational violence, a place of assassination and terror. I recall a
taxi driver in Zagreb giving me a detailed and complex geography lesson to show
that Croatia was not part of the Balkans, an argument predicated on the river Sava
being the real border with the Balkans. In the end, as is the case so often in the
region, the real separation was a religious one, Croatia was Catholic, while
everything to the east was either Orthodox or Muslim. As the journalist and writer
Misha Glenny wrote in his history of the Balkans since 1804: “If somebody displays a
‘Balkan mentality’, for example, it implies a predilection for deceit, exaggeration and
unreliability. As Yugoslavia began to disintegrate in 1989, generalisations about the
peoples who inhabit the region, and their histories, were spread by media
organisations that had long ago outlawed such clichés when reporting from Africa,
the Middle East or China. The Balkans apparently enjoy a special exemption from
the rules against stereotyping.’

The people of southeastern Europe assume that everyone outside the Balkans
views the region as a negative. Some years ago, while working in Bulgaria, I read to
a group of university students an account of a people known for their irrational
violence and terror, who were nearer to animals than real people. The account came
from Punch. When I asked who was being described, the Balkans identified their
stereotype without hesitation. No, I said, it was the Irish. They were puzzled.
Most commentators still view the Balkans as a land of “ancient hatreds”, including
Robert Kaplan, whose book, Balkan Ghosts, was read by President Clinton at the
height of the War in former Yugoslavia. Kaplan’s basic argument was that the hatred
for each other among the people of southeastern Europe was beyond any outside
influence. Consequently, it is said, Clinton did not want to intervene in the war.
Other unflattering views of the Balkans include that of Agatha Christie, who
invented a country called Herzoslovakia. Herzoslovakia, she wrote: “Principal
rivers, unknown. Principal mountains, also unknown, but fairly numerous. Capital,
Ekarest. Population, chiefly brigands. Hobby, assassinating kings and having
revolutions.” The country suffered from “periodic revolutions”. The historian
Edward Gibbon wrote in Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire that Croatia and Bosnia
were “still infested by tribes of barbarians. “Kosovo,” Tony Blair said in April 1999,
“is on the doorstep of Europe”, something geographers would contest but which
probably coincided with a popular view that the Balkans occupied a transitional
place between well-ordered and civilised Europe and the chaos of the Orient.
Conversely, throughout The Great Cauldron, Calic draws attention to the
interaction between southeastern Europe and the Western world. In 1776, the Comte
de Choiseul-Gouffier, a future French ambassador to the Ottoman empire, visited a
Greek Orthodox monastery on the island of Patmos and was asked by a local monk:
“Is Voltaire still living?” In Romania, after the outbreak of the American civil war in
1861, “boyars, soldiers, priests, intellectuals and educated ladies read the translation
of Uncle Tom’s Cabin”, finding in the campaign to abolish slavery a model for the
cause of social reform at home. Likewise, Jovan Skerlic, an early twentieth century
Serbian literary theorist, wrote that the choice facing his region was “either to accept
western culture and live, as the Japanese have done, or to oppose it and be overrun,
as has happened to the American Indians and Australian aborigines”.
For much of its history the region was central to international developments and
Calic is correct to begin her history from the earliest times, so that we understand
southeastern Europe’s place in the Roman empire, in the great religious debates, as
the seat of religious dualism that spread with huge consequences to medieval
France, and of the division in the Roman empire and the Christian church into
Catholicism based in Rome, and Orthodoxy in Byzantium. Later, of course, Islam
was added to the mix, as was Judaism.
Of major importance to Calic’s thesis, that southeastern Europe was and is part of
the European mainstream, is the Enlightenment. Unlike the Enlightenment in
Western Europe, that in southeastern Europe was religious. Atheism, deism and
anti-clericalism had no roots therre. The educated elite who promoted
Enlightenment values and writing were almost exclusively clerics. It was only after
the French Revolution that the church recognised the subversive nature of the ideas
and their power.

The Enlightenment is hugely important and whether the Balkans even
experienced it is a fundamental question, because it is the start of the modern world.
Western historiography would claim there was never an “authentic” enlightenment
in the Balkans and if there was an intellectual development it was rather a question
of how Western ideas were accepted, or were not. Calic argues that the problem with
this interpretation is that it is based on the assumption that Enlightenment was a
uniform phenomenon that occurred within a strict time period and was defined by
radical sceptical French philosophy. Newer research, she maintains, shows a much
broader spectrum, with different national, regional and confessional
“enlightenments” existing within Europe and the world. No one today doubts that
what we call the Scottish Enlightenment was different from the French
Enlightenment, for instance.
But what becomes evident is that the desire for cultural renewal and social
progress would ultimately bring the political order in the Balkans to the point of
collapse. “Intellectural and cultural changes thus paved the way for the later
revolutions of the 19th century,” Calic states. In other words, the growth of Balkan
nationalism, the wars for independence from Ottoman Turkey, the two Balkan wars
– which defined southeastern Europe as a place of savagery – were only possible
because the values of the Enlightenment had been accepted, albeit in a very different
form to that of France, for instance. But, as Calic argues, the Balkan Enlightenment,
centred on clerical intellectuals, and national histories written by churchmen, was as
legitimate as the French, the German or the Scottish. It was the “enlighted
absolutism” of Catherine the Great in Russia that had a major role of spreading the
new philosophical ideas among the Christians of the Ottoman empire. It was the
acceptance of those Enlightenment values and what came afterwards, a growing
awareness of nationalism, that makes the Balkans so distinctly European.
From the Enlightenment, through the two Balkan wars to the First World War, the
people of the region began to think of themselves as belonging to specific nations
rather than being simply Catholic, Orthodox or Muslim, as they had been
categorised under the Ottomans, religion as a marker of identity becoming a
“national” phenomenon. National histories, written in the various languages of the
region, helped to encourage this change, and as there were no obvious geographic
and ethnic boundaries, conflict was almost inevitable. This trend was further
encouraged by the role the great powers played as they circled each other, watching
the void that was opening up as the power of the Ottoman empire in the Balkans
declined.
In a subject this large it could be difficult to find the space for the detail, the
stories that brings a narrative alive. Calic is good at describing life in Plovdiv,
Dubrovnik, Zagreb, Thessaloniki or Sarajevo. She also litters her story with
fascinating individuals, such as the Greek-born Croatian bishop Ivan Dominik
Stratiko. After his education in Rome and Florence, he joined the Dominicans and
taught philosophy and theology. He admired the works of Voltaire, Montesquieu
and Rousseau. “He was able to take certain liberties because of his fame and
popularity and his success with women astonished even the Venetian Giacomo
Casanova,” writes Calic.

He was also a reformer who worked to improve the lives of the impoverished
people of his diocese in Croatia. As well as putting in place projects to improve their
lot, he wrote against censorship, in favour of equality of the sexes, and against the
Austrian Archduke Leopold. There are others, including the Greek merchant and
poet Rhigas Velestinlis, whose revolutionary pamphlet called for a general uprising
against Ottoman tyranny as early as 1797, or Eugenios Voulgaris, the director of the
philosophy academy on the Holy Mountain of Athos and one of the most prominent
proponents of the Enlightenment. The monk Paisi wrote a Slavo-Bulgarian history,
the first synthesis of Bulgarian history, in his monastery library. It was hardly a
scholarly work, but it was in Bulgarian, a language he championed, and might be
considered a forerunner of the Bulgarian national movement.
Calic is strong on how economic activity moved from the Mediterranean to the
Atlantic and how, just as the region was achieving independence, it found itself, like
Ireland and southern Europe, on the economic periphery.
Given her scholarship and expertise – as well as being an historian and
commentator on southeastern Europe at Munich’s Ludwig Maximilians University –
she was an adviser to the Special Co-ordinator for the Stability Pact for South
Eastern Europe and for the UN Special Representative for the Former Yugoslavia.
She also worked for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
at The Hague. Given that background, it is unlikely she would suggest that the
collapse of the former Yugoslavia and the subsequent war was due to ancient
hatreds. It was. she says, the fault of those in charge, who ordered the demise of the
federal state, who are to blame. She opposes any deterministic explanations that
Balkan exceptionalism brought about the end of Yugoslavia and highlights the
agency of twentieth-century modern mass society, including its media, in the
politicisation of differences.
The horrors of the war in former Yugoslavia seemed to some be a return to an
earlier period of violence, ethnic cleansing and mass crimes, but there were now
different international actors and it was not the nineteenth century any more.
Following the cessation of the war much of southeastern Europe “built democratic
systems and largely normalised their relations with one another. Today, the great
majority of governments share a pro-European orientation.”
Since becoming members of the EU, Slovenia, Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania have
moved closer to the average per capita income of Europe as a whole, she says, not
only because of EU membership but due to the conditions of accession. While
acknowledging the continuing issues of identities and borders she clearly sees the
future of the Balkans within the European Union and that the entire region has
within it the resources to allow it to achieve accession.
This is a monumental work, taking us from Alexander the Great to the European
Union, using sources from almost every European language and insisting that
history should tell the story of the Balkans in its own terms rather than through the
lens of former imperial powers.
Given Calic’s analysis it is difficult to comprehend Emmanuel Macron’s current
position of opposing the start of accession talks with North Macedonia, Albania and
other countries in the region. Though Macron is keen to take over the leadership of
the EU, he fails to see the centrality of the EU to so many Balkan countries, and their

quest to be a real part of Europe. One wonders if he views the Balkans as a violent
and irrational place full of terror and assassinations and not really part of Europe at
all. Maybe he should find time read The Great Cauldron.
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Michael Foley worked in media development in southeastern Europe. He is professor
emeritus at the School of Media, Technological University Dublin. He is researching a
biography of the nineteenth century Times correspondent in the Balkans, the Irish born
James Bourchier.

